Adrian Bradshaw: Painting over billboard with Maoist slogan
How to succeed Mao?
How to evaluate Mao and his rule?
How to reform the CCP?
Sent-down Memories: Gendered and Generational
Xi Jinping in Shaanxi
Sent-down generation: not just former red guards, though firmly associated with the group
How to evaluate the experience against the history of the Cultural Revolution?
Life after the sent-down campaign: How did that shape our understanding?
Personal experience: Higher status, fonder memories?
Generational memory: Personal experience vs. Historical evaluation
Xi Jinping as Sent-Down Youth
Xi Jinping on Sent-down Years
Xi Jinping: Seven Years as Sent-down Youth
A story of resilience, perseverance, and success
Went down voluntarily to rural Shaanxi after purge against father Xi Zhongxun
Recommended by local people to study at Tsinghua University as “worker-peasant-soldier student”
Sent-down years as foundation of “man-of-the-people” leadership
Cultural Revolution by the numbers
Children carrying poster of Mao during Cultural Revolution
27.2 million victims, including 1.73 million deaths
Most victims not the result of mass insurgency, but political and military authority
17 million sent-down youth
Party-state bureaucracy weakened and divided
Crisis of legitimacy: 3 million+ citizens awaiting rehabilitation
What was the Cultural Revolution?
Destruction of Leninist party-state
Central Committee downsized, gutted, paralyzed
Replaced by Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG)
Replaced by committees merging civilian, military cadres with rebel representatives
Mass insurgency
Red Guards
Worker Movement
Puzzle about the Cultural Revolution
In the longue-durée
A united front involving students, workers, and merchants gave rise to the May Fourth Movement, but this is rare.
China’s bureaucratic system rewarded intellectuals for their loyalty and encouraged scholars to think of themselves as superior to manual laborers.
During the Cultural Revolution
Student Red Guards served as the principal social force in igniting the Cultural Revolution, but they were soon overshadowed by worker rebels.
During the early phase of the Cultural Revolution, the rift was bridged — albeit fitfully — by Red Guards and worker rebels.
By the end of the sent-down youth campaign, the relationship between workers and students/intellectuals shifted from cooperation to rift again.
Mass Science: Tu Youyou
Tu Youyou, pharmaceutical chemist who discovered artemisinin and dihydroartemisinin, used to treat malaria
Discovered artemisinin, derived from the sweet wormwood plant, in the early 1970s.
Developed dihydroartemisinin, a more potent derivative of artemisinin, significantly improving malaria treatment.
Received the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 2015; the first Chinese woman to receive a Nobel Prize in science.
Continued her research and advocacy for traditional medicine and its integration with modern science.
Mass Science as Model
Barefoot doctor
Not tension between “pro-science” and “anti-science” factions
“Combining indigenous methods with foreign methods”
Emphasis on “home-grown policies”: local inventions and experimentations
Instead of relying on trained experts, mobilization of peasants, rural cadres, women, youth
Mao era in retrospect
Mao Zedong proclaiming the founding of the PRC, 1949
A system of both tremendous strength and startling instability
Spasmodic: lurching from one politically induced crisis to another
Individual responsibility vs. collective guilt
Utopian ideal vs. violent reality
Cultural Revolution: Ironies and Contradictions
Mao’s stated goal vs. methods
Mao opposed the bureaucratic totalitarianism of the Stalinist system, yet he successfully launched the Cultural Revolution by fully utilizing that same system’s immense mobilization capabilities.
Cultural Revolution: Ironies and Contradictions, continued
Mao’s desire for a “Paris Commune” vs. his own position:
Mao envisioned a system where officials and citizens were equal and interchangeable. But he was a supreme, almost divine, leader.
Claim of mass movement vs. manipulation:
While the Cultural Revolution appeared to be a spontaneous mass movement, it was also orchestrated and controlled by Mao, with strict limitations on genuine independent thought or action.
Cultural Revolution: Ironies and Contradictions, continued
Violence of “restoring order” vs. “chaos”:
The official phase of “restoring order” through Revolutionary Committees involved far greater and more systematic violence than the chaotic factional fighting among the masses, yet this state-sanctioned violence was often downplayed.
Mao’s goal to prevent capitalist restoration vs. outcome:
Mao’s efforts to prevent capitalist restoration through the Cultural Revolution ultimately accelerated the very “revisionism” and “bourgeoisie restoration” he feared, making later reforms easier.
Court politics
Gang of Four
Continuation of Maoist line: political mobilization, class struggle, egalitarianism
Control of propaganda and cultural apparatus
Upper hand from mid-1973 to spring 1974
“Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius” campaign as allegorical vehicle for attacking Zhou and Deng
Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai
Economic growth, stability, educational progress, pragmatic opening to the West
Revival of “Four Modernizations” (of agriculture, industry, science and tech, and defense)
Control over executive organs of political system
Deng stripped of all positions in April 1976, after Zhou Enlai’s death and mass demonstrations
1976: A year of political earthquakes
Tiananmen gathering in commemoration of Zhou Enlai’s death, 1976
1976-01-08: Zhou Enlai’s death, triggering mass protests at Tiananmen Sqr
1976-07-28: Tangshan Earthquake, resulting in 242,000 deaths
1976-09-09: Mao Zedong’s death
1976-10-06: Arrest of Gang of Four
Chen Yun on Mao Zedong
Chen Yun (1905-1995) in 1958
Had Mao died in 1956, his achievements would have been immortal. Had he died in 1966, he would still have been a great man but flawed. But he died in 1976. Alas, what can one say?
Recap: Mao era in retrospect
Mao Zedong proclaiming the founding of the PRC, 1949
A system of both tremendous strength and startling instability
Spasmodic: lurching from one politically induced crisis to another
Individual responsibility vs. collective guilt
Utopian ideal vs. violent reality
Youth: The Characters
Lin Dingding, Li Xiaofeng, Xiao Huizi
He Xiaoping (second from left)
Youth: The Story
Youth: The Story, continued
He Xiaoping on the front line
He Xiaoping
Liu Feng
Liu Feng
Lei Feng
He Xiaoping
Liu Feng greets He Xiaoping
He Xiaoping
The Love Triangles
Lin Dingding and Li Xiaofeng confront He Xiaoping
Liu Feng interrogated
The War
Youth: Narrator
Xiao Huizi
Who is the narrator, Xiao Huizi? What is her life story?
What does she remember about the Mao era? How does it compare with other accounts?
Have her memories changed? If so, how?
Individual memory vs. Collective memory: Is there a difference?
Youth: Main Characters
Dance troupe
Who are the main characters?
What happened to them?
Youth: Historical Events
Liu Feng visits He Xiaoping
How is history presented in the film? What changed / didn’t change from one period to the other?
Final years of the Cultural Revolution
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979
Reform and opening up
Youth: Gender and Sexuality
Lin Dingding and Liu Feng
Romantic relationships, sexual desires, and clandestine affairs: What was considered acceptable or not, and why?
Why can’t Liu Feng have desire? Freedom and repression of sexuality among Red Guards
Youth: Gender and Sexuality, continued
Is there a gendered difference in romance and sexuality?
Where’s the relationship between private life and political life?
Rae Yang: “Red Guards Had No Sex” vs. Kristen Ghodsee: “Why Women Have Better Sex Under Socialism”
Youth: Family
He Xiaoping and Liu Feng
What is the family background of He Xiaoping? How did it shape her life?
“The Cultural Revolution destroyed Chinese families” – Did it?
“The dance troupe is our family” – Is it?
He Xiaoping and Liu Feng: Another kind of family?
Youth: Art and Politics
Why a dance troupe?
How does art serve politics?
What scenes might have been removed before its public screening in China? Why?
Who is the intended audience of the film? What might be their reactions?
Youth: Politics of Memory
How did the film handle narratives of trauma and violence?
Svetlana Boym: “The twentieth century began with utopia and ended with nostalgia.” Explain in the context of the film.
What explains nostalgia for the Cultural Revolution in China today?
Youth: Farewell to Mao
What happened to the dance troupe after the Mao era?
Who were the “winners” / “losers”? Why?
Sino-Vietnamese War: External Factors
Why did China and Vietnam, two socialist countries, go to war in 1979?
Vietnam’s shift in allegiance from China to the Soviet Union: mutual defense treaty in November 1978
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and overthrow of the Khmer Rouge — China’s Maoist ally
Fear of Soviet invasion: 1.5 million PLA troops along Chinese-Soviet border
Three-way struggle: China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union
Sino-Vietnamese War: Playing the American Card
Deng Xiaoping’s meeting with President Jimmy Carter, two weeks before China’s entry to war.
Goal: Secure America’s backing and neutralize the Soviet Union’s potential military invasion of China.
Appeal to America’s other strategic goals: defeating the Soviet Union, exiting the Vietnam quagmire, and disarming Pyongyang’s nukes.
Enemy of my enemy is my friend
Nixon meets Mao, 1972
Mao Zedong:
The Soviet Union as “main contradiction”; America as secondary threat
Richard Nixon:
Progressive withdrawal of US forces in Vietnam
China not as a rogue actor, but in need of being “brought in from the cold” in twilight struggle against Soviet Union
“The week that changed the world”
Richard Nixon eating with Zhou Enlai and Zhang Chunqiao
Chronology:
1971-04: “Ping Pong diplomacy”
1971-07: Kissinger’s secret trip to China
1971-09: Death of Lin Biao
1972-02: Nixon’s visit to China
“The week that changed the world”: Significance
Richard Nixon eating with Zhou Enlai and Zhang Chunqiao
Transformation of China from Communist threat to quasi-ally
Security triangle: China as swing player between two superpowers
China safe from both US and Soviet attacks
Sino-Vietnamese War: Internal Factors
Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, and Hua Guofeng
Deng Xiaoping sought to consolidate his control over the military.
Deng also wished to diminish the power of Hua Guofeng, Mao Zedong’s chosen successor.
Sino-Vietnamese War: China’s Goals
Primary goal: not territorial conquest
Retaliation against Vietnam while minimizing its exposure to a potential two-front war with both Vietnam and the USSR
Demonstration of military strength
Realignment with the United States
Sino-Vietnamese War: Outcome for China
Loss
Unable to achieve its goal of removing Vietnam from Cambodia, as Vietnam’s occupation lasted until 1989.
Heightened Vietnam’s animosity toward China.
Peace negotiations between China and Vietnam didn’t occur until 1991, after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Exposed the PLA’s poor performance
Win
Prevented a Soviet invasion from the north due to U.S. support.
Helped Deng Xiaoping gain power within the CCP.
US Support: establishment of Beijing embassy in 1979, in the middle of the war
Prompting a military modernization drive.
Mao’s China: GDP Compared
Life Expectancy & Infant Mortality Rate: China vs. Developing Asian Economies
GDP per Capita (Current USD): China vs. Developed Asian Countries, 1960-1980
Life Expectancy & Infant Mortality Rate: China vs. Developing Asian Economies
China’s Share of Global GDP (Current USD)
GDP: China vs. Russia (Current USD)
GDP: India vs. China (Current USD)
China in 1978: Under-performer, not a failure
Low-income: GDP per capita lower than large sub-Saharan Africa
Human development level: Upper-middle-income economy
Comprehensive economic infrastructure
A country with abundant human resources, but bottled up in countryside
(Misguided) capital intense development strategy: heavy industry
Hua vs. Deng
Hua Guofeng
1977-02: “Two whatevers”:
“Resolutely defend whatever political decisions taken by Mao”
“Unwaveringly follow whatever directives issued by Mao”
Deng Xiaoping
1978-03: “Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth”
Transform CCP from revolutionary party to reform-oriented and pragmatic one
Four modernizations (of agriculture, industry, science and tech, and defense) as top priority
Performance-based legitimacy: Economic development as number one priority
Chicken and egg problem: Origin of development
How can poor and weak societies escape poverty traps? Which comes first – economic growth or good governance?
Modernization theory
Growth => Good governance
Rising middle class demand greater rights, freedom, and ultimately democracy
Weberian model
Rule of law as institutional condition for development
World Bank, IMF, etc.: “Get governance right” before markets can grow
Max Weber: Professional bureaucracy, specialized and impersonal
Discuss: Advice to Chinese leadership
Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun,Chen Haosu, and Hu Yaobang in 1982
What to reform?
How to begin?
Where to start?
Wanxiang: In the Beginning
Who is Lu Guanqiu? How did he start his business career?
What was it like to run a business during the Cultural Revolution?
What was the business model of Wanxiang’s precursor?
Timeline
Wanxiang
1969: Start-up at the depth of the Cultural Revolution
1977: Access to market; one of three surviving universal-joint producers
1993: Wanxiang America founded
China/Global
1978: Reform era begins
1985: Plaza Accord
2000: Entry to the WTO
Place: Major Cities in Zhejiang
The first windfall
Out of plan:
Lu’s village business was excluded from the central economic plan: it can’t easily get raw materials or sell his farm tools.
He survived by using scrap steel from nearby villages.
First breakthrough:
His high-quality tools was adopted by the municipal farm-tool company in Hangzhou.
The government included his factory in the economic plan, granting him steel quotas and market access.
By the late 1970s, commitment to quality allowed Wanxiang to survive as one of the only three universal joints makers in China.
Wanxiang’s First Star Product: Universal Joint
Lu Guanqiu focused on producing universal joints (in Chinese, wanxiangjie 萬向節), recognizing market potential from government plans for increased car and truck production.
TVE
What is a TVE (township village enterprise)? How is it different from an SOE (state-owned enterprise)?
What was the origin of TVEs? How did they evolve?
What explains their success?
“Contracting output to households”: In Agriculture
TVE, as a key pillar of China’s rural industrialization, was part of a broader production responsibility system.
Gave a household control over a plot of land in return for the delivery of an agreed quantity of grain after harvest
This allowed households to effectively rent land from collectives and sell surplus on the market.
“Contracting output to households”
Herbert Stachelberger, Farmers on mule cart, 1978
Household contracting of communal land, in return for delivery quota after harvest
Reformers: “Renting” land from the collectives
Conservatives: Ideologically unacceptable; it would be the end of collective agriculture
Reform without losers
Adrian Bradshaw: A Street Market
Virtuous circle:
Production responsibility system
Agricultural growth
Expansion of labor: Farm households working in non-agriculture, especially TVEs
Shift in developmental strategy:
Expanding output while decreasing labor inputs
From capital intensive (heavy industry) to labor-intensive development strategy
From rural to urban reform
Rural
Household responsibility system: Division of communal land for private cultivation
Township and village enterprises (TVE)
Urban
Contract responsibility system (1984): autonomy and profits to state-owned enterprises
Special economic zones (1980): Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen; further expansion in 1984
Dual track approach: State-owned enterprises allowed to sell output exceeding quota at market prices
Dual track economy
Herbert Stachelberger, Street Market, 1978
Co-existence of traditional planned economy and market channel
Produce planned output, selling at plan prices
Excess sold outside the plan at market prices
Reduction of state monopoly enhanced competition
Plan and state sector became less dominant elements in economy
Incentivizing growth
Adrian Bradshaw: Government store
System of profit retention
“Factory manager responsibility system”: managers, not party secretary, given top authority
Local gov retention of revenue above control figure
Universities and research institutes allowed to set up profit-making subsidiaries
Cadre promotion based on local economic and fiscal growth
“Crossing the river by touching the stones”
Herbert Stachelberger, Fishing family, 1978
Incremental and improvised, but also broad and bold
Top-down direction but also de-centralized improvisation
Inflationary economy with shortages => Political backlash
Contract system: Case of Wanxiang
Lu Guanqiu pioneered the “contract system” in 1983.
He guaranteed fixed annual payments to the village government, with yearly increases.
In return, he received exclusive management rights for three years.
Factory output significantly increased from RMB 5.5 million (1983) to RMB 19 million (1985).
Wenzhou Model: All Buttoned-up
Wenzhou’s economy started with tiny, household-based private ownership.
They specialized in common items like buttons and ribbons, filling market gaps.
Production was heavily coordinated by markets: Industries formed chains where households specialized in single production stages.
Overtime, Wenzhou model led to the development of private banks and real estate firms.
TVE: Impact
TVEs were the most dynamic part of China’s economy from 1978 to the mid-1990s.
Key stats
China experienced “miracle growth” of over 10% annually from 1983-1988.
TVE employment grew from 28 million in 1978 to 135 million in 1996.
This represented a 9% annual growth rate in employment.
TVEs’ contribution to GDP increased from less than 6% in 1978 to 26% in 1996.
Behind the numbers:
Rural households shifted to production responsibility systems.
Mao-era capital-intensive development strategies abandoned: TVEs broke the monopoly of state-owned enterprises in industrial production.
Household contracting focused on labor-intensive goods. Previously banned, lower-cost production methods grew rapidly.
Overtime, cities absorbed young people into new service and manufacturing jobs.
Explaining TVE’s Success
Factor
Description
China’s factor endowment
TVEs used abundant labor rather than subsidized capital.
SOEs as rival partners
TVEs initially benefited from protected markets and monopoly rents (through contracts from SOEs) but later thrived by filling unmet consumer goods needs and market niches.
A favorable institutional framework
local government support, low tax rates, and reinvestment of funds.
Proximity to urban areas
Fostered rural industry growth through revived urban-rural linkages, subcontracting, and access to urban resources.
Organizational diversity
2000+ counties, 1 million+ villages in China. Even though a county remained a mini command economy, it was open to competition from thousands of townships and villages, which produced a diversity of business models ranging from government-run to private.
Guangdong Model vs. Zhejiang Model
Guangdong Model
TVEs in the Pearl River Delta grew rapidly with foreign investment.
Hong Kong and Taiwanese businessmen, with local ties, pioneered these cooperative village businesses.
Village leaders managed land, export contracts, and labor.
The PRD model was highly open to foreign trade, investment, and workers from elsewhere in China.
Special Economic Zones
SEZs in China, ca 2020
Earning foreign exchange and importing foreign technology
Foreign firms given concessionary access to long-term land use, tax breaks, and separate legal mandate
Local govs given budgetary and policy autonomy
Wanxiang: Other factors of success
Human capital
Wanxiang hired high-school graduates to overcome difficulties in recruiting qualified employees as a TVE.
R&D
Wanxiang invested 5%-7% of its annual revenue in research and development. The “Four Heights” policy was introduced to improve quality through increased investment in technology, better equipment, higher personnel standards, and superior products.
State-business relationship
Despite becoming a private enterprise in 1994, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained influence through key personnel like Lu and his son, and CCP officials in management.
Wanxiang: Going Global
Zeller was the first American company to buy Chinese auto parts from Wanxiang in 1984.
Wanxiang signed a large supply agreement with Zeller in 1985.
But when Zeller demanded exclusive distribution rights, Wanxiang refused.
Wanxiang successfully sold its excess products and overcame the hardship.
Zeller later renegotiated a new contract of over 1 million with Wanxiang in 1988.
In 2000, Wanxiang acquired Zeller Corporation: “earning foreigners’ money, using foreigners’ resources, being foreigners’ bosses, in a foreigners’ land.”
Wanxiang America
Who is Ni Pin, Wanxiang’s US CEO?
What is Wanxiang America’s business model? How has it evolved?
Is Wanxiang American or Chinese?
Wanxiang’s Success: Larger context
Rapid growth of auto-industry in China: Surpassed US in sales in 2009
Rapid consolidation of US parts company: 50% gone as they were unable to compete in new cost-sensitive market
New tech frontier emerging: EVs
Wanxiang America: Localization Strategy
Over $1 billion in revenue
4000+ staff, only 15 Chinese employees
Big three auto companies as largest consumers
Manufacturing moved to China: $0.9/hr wage vs. $22.5/hr (US)
Using acquisitions to see which processes could be enhanced and transferred to China
Invests in maintaining proprietary technologies in US
Ni Pin on Wanxiang America
Wanxiang: Case Study
Successful non-state owned enterprise
Family firm, with roots in early rural industrialization
A Chinese company’s global strategy: Growth in the US, with limited public opposition
Wanxiang: After the Case
By end of 2007, Wanxiang Group reached ~RMB40 billion in revenues (≈US$5.6B), with Wanxiang America generating over US$1 billion and the Group operating ~20 manufacturing plants across the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and Europe. What happened next?
Year
Event
2009
Built a large lithium‑ion battery production base (commenced operation by end of 2009) as part of long‑term EV/battery strategy.
2012
Negotiated strategic investment in A123 Systems (initial Aug. 2012 deal), then pursued and won the bankruptcy auction for A123’s assets in Dec. 2012 (deal subject to court/CFIUS review).
2016
Won NDRC approval to build EV production facilities in China (planned capacity: 50,000 EVs/year; project investment ≈US$375M).
2017
Founder Lu Guanqiu died (Oct. 2017); Lu Weiding succeeded as Chairman/CEO and Ni Pin remained a senior executive—Wanxiang continued global EV and clean‑energy initiatives.
Biggest Risk: Future of American Car Industry
Is there a future for a domestic US auto industry? If it continues to decline, what does the future hold for Wanxiang America, especially when US?
Tesla: Half of its Cars are Made in China
How China Became the World’s Largest Car Exporter
Take-away: Decentralized reform
Liu Heung Shing: Man drinking cocoa-cola inside the Forbidden City
Center does not dictate actions, but instead authorizes boundaries of local experiments, define and reward success, and encourage mutual exchange.
Regional economies (provinces, municiplaities, counties) increasingly competitive; local governments holding responsibility for initiating and coordinating reforms
Result: Mixture of top-down direction and bottom-up improvisation.
Take-away: Co-evolution of politics and economics
Adrian Bradshaw: A man shows off a personal cassette player in the street
Use weak institutions to build markets
Emerging markets stimulate the creation of strong institutions