Introduction

Modalities of State Building and Institution Building: Bureaucracies, Campaigns, and Performance

What makes for states that are well consolidated, with high levels of capacity for engaging in the kinds of actions essential for governing and legitimacy? Is there a general formula, or at least a common set of patterns, that distinguishes states that are relatively successful in these ways, and conversely, is there a comparable core of problems and institutions that are widely shared by states that are not well consolidated with high levels of capacity? To what extent, if any, do subjective "soft" factors like norms, ideology, and the prior existence of traditions of governance render it easier or more difficult for those involved in state making to create, stabilize, or transform state institutions? Does the way in which chosen policies are implemented matter for the institutionalization of the state organizations that are doing the implementing?

While these seemingly simple questions about what the state is, how it forms, how it behaves, and how it becomes more (or less) effective has been debated from the time of the great nineteenth-century sociologists to the present, there is little resolution to these questions. Those who write on the state are deeply divided over what the state is, how real it is as an entity, and whether it can be considered separate from either the society over which it ostensibly presides or the government that directs it. Max Weber and the multiple generations of his intellectual descendants in sociology and political science from Reinhard Bendix to contemporary comparative historical institutionalists see the state and the institutions that constitute it to be a self-evident and obvious entity that is distinguishable from both the government that sits atop the institutions of the state at any given moment in time and the societies over which the state rules. Others subscribe to different variants within a broadly Marxist tradition. Some, like Marx himself, tend to reduce the state to class interests (that "the state is nothing more than the executive committee of the ruling bourgeoisie"),[1] while Gramsci and a long line of his intellectual heirs from Poulantzas and Foucault to Jessop, Mitchell and beyond stress the "realm

[1] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 11

of ideology and cultural practices and the ways in which states and citizens are mutually constitutive."[2]

Although this is now changing, many (but by no means all) of the cases taken up by sociologists and political scientists working in comparative historical analysis focus on state institutions in Europe and the Americas. These scholars have, reasonably enough given their subject matter, tilted to the "big questions" of advanced industrial or rapidly industrializing economies, variation within Latin America, the state's role in development, or some combination of these three. There is a substantial literature on institutional variation in social democracy, welfare regimes, and industrial policy for Europe, the United States, and Japan, an intersecting clutch of works on variation in state capacity (often but not exclusively measured by willingness and ability to tax populations) for Latin America, and a third that broadly engages the question of how developmental states arise and function.[3] In the last decade, these approaches have been supplemented by major historical institutional works that engage variation within both South Asia and Southeast Asia.[4] There is also an exciting new wave of comparative historical-institutional work on arenas of long-overlooked state action: counterrevolution, state coercion, and violence.[5] And we are now beginning to see historical/institutional

[2] I am enormously indebted to John L. Brooke, who did the lion's share of the heavy lifting in constructing the bibliography and the preliminary analysis on the different lineages of thinking about the state. For a fuller discussion and bibliography see John L. Brooke and Julia C. Strauss, "Introduction: Approaches to State Formation," in Brooke, Strauss and Anderson, eds., *State Formations, Global Histories and Cultures of Statehood*, pp. 1–12.

[3] An only very partial list of the some of the most significant books would include: Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan*; Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*; Sven Steinmo, *The Evolution of Modern States: Sweden, Japan, and the United States*; and Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities.* An entire sub-field of comparative industrial policy for Northeast Asia was kick-started by Chalmers Johnson's classic work *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–75*. Important works on Latin America include: Deborah Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*; Tulia Falleti, *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*; Marcus Kurtz, *Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective: Social Foundations of Institutional Order*, and Hillel David Soifer, *State Building in Latin America*. For Africa see Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, (Princeton, 2002/2014, 2nd ed.). See also Erik Kuhonta, *The Institutional Imperative: The Politics of Equitable Development in Southeast Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012) and Tuong Vu, *Paths to Development in Asia: South Korea, Vietnam, China, and Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[4] For Southeast Asia see Dan Slater, *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, 2010); for South Asia see Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan* (Cambridge, 2013).

[5] Sheena Chestnut Greitens offers a satisfying and sophisticated analysis of the ways in which the institutional origins of coercion and state violence vary in Taiwan, the

work that explicitly engages comparative cases in very different world regions, notably Brazil and South Africa, and Africa and Southeast Asia, albeit to explain some of the "harder" elements of state institutions, namely taxation and the longevity of single-party systems.[6]

There is much of value in each of these sub-groupings within the comparative historical-institutional approach. These are works that are historically well grounded, give due attention to such important factors as temporal sequencing and critical junctures (when political actors have much more in the way of openness to make decisions about institutional design, mission, or the coalitions formed in support), and build in room for both contingency (e.g. exogenous shocks) and the agency of state actors. Much of this analysis either implicitly or explicitly employs notions of path dependence, whereby decisions made early in a particular political process of building state institutions may well foreclose other possibilities further down the line, leading to "lock in."[7] These works are also excellent on the ways in which states interact with core elites, especially if those core elites are relatively well organized, forming "protection pacts" or "provision pacts" (Slater), developing state administrations that are either patrimonial or bureaucratic depending on the relative strength of corporate bodies and the timing of the state building effort (Ertman), or opting for "deployed rule" versus "delegated rule" (Soifer). While this scholarship is superb on sketching out broad comparative trends, it reveals relatively little about process, implementation, and the intelligibility of the state's core projects at the time they were undertaken, for example, *how* protection or provision pacts were formed and justified (to both participatory elites and larger publics), or *how* aspiring state makers attempted to move from patrimonial to bureaucratic forms of state administration (and with what kinds of tactics, legitimating arguments, and responses) in early modern Europe. In Latin America, did state makers adopt either deployed or delegated rule simply because it had long been that way and no other options were conceivable? When state makers attempted to move from delegated to deployed rule, what sorts of normative appeals did they make, and what kinds of coalitions (if any) did they attempt to create? Did successful policy implementation in one arena have an impact on policy implementation in other spheres of state activity? In short, in their focus on the outcomes and

Philippines, and South Korea in *Dictatorships and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*.

[6] Evan Lieberman, *Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa*; Dan Slater and Nicholas Rush Smith, "The Power of Counterrevolution: Elitist Origins of Political Order in Asia and Africa."

[7] Paul Pierson, "Power and Path Dependence"; Giovanni Capoccia, "Critical Junctures and Institutional Change."

broad trends within state making, these comparative institutional accounts rarely explain the often messy and complex processes by which institutions came into being, how they garnered or failed to garner the loyalty of their administrative staff, how they generated sufficient capacity to make it possible to implement core (or new) projects, or how they went about explaining, justifying, and communicating the wisdom and validity of their state projects to wider audiences in order to establish legitimacy – the very warp and weft of what states *do* above and beyond system maintenance.

While in no way disregarding the excellence of these works and indeed drawing substantial inspiration from them, this monograph has a slightly different focus. It goes "one level down" from outcomes and structures to consider many of the substantive details – the "hows" that are either assumed or elided in most comparative historical analysis: what are the state's core agendas, how its political and administrative elites frame questions of strategy, how new capacity is generated, and how state-building programs and policies are implemented in practice. John Brooke and I have suggested elsewhere that while scholarly writing on the state has tended to fall into "broadly two competing lineages informed by Max Weber and Antonio Gramsci, focusing respectively on a macro approach to institutions and capacities and a micro approach to cultures and practices," Weberian/institutional and Gramscian/cultural approaches might well be complementary, rather than in opposition to one another.[8] This book is, at heart, an effort to integrate the macro Weberian concern with institutions and capacities with the Gramscian sensitivity to the impact of cultures and practices by asking the following question: *how* do signature state policies and the way in which they are implemented have an impact on the development of state capacity and instruct citizens in the norms and ethos of the state? In this way I hope to suggest ways in which cultures and practices inform the creation and expansion of institutions and capacities in times of critical (dis)juncture, when a new government is engaged in a wider process of regime consolidation, establishing new institutions of control and social order, setting out new rules of political engagement, and in the ideal generating new legitimacy among the citizenry.

I take as axiomatic the Weberian notion of the state as a set of institutions that embody some form of centrality, claim ultimate political authority over a given territory, and are backed up by set of administrative and indeed coercive organizations.[9] But I go beyond a Weberian focus on

[8] Brooke and Strauss, pp. 1, 20–21.
[9] Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results."

institutions to stress how the state's administrative organizations make themselves visible and intelligible through different kinds of performances that signal what the state aspires to be and what it expects of its citizens. States are comprised of formal organizations, which are in turn formed, staffed, and deployed by human agents to implement particular activities and programs – often in the teeth of indifference or resistance from other human agents in society. Thus state making necessarily involves (often multiple and contending) imperatives in first thinking through what ought to be done, developing policies and programs to pursue core state agendas, and overcoming often substantial inertia or resistance. It is here, in the realm of state agendas and activities, that a broadly post-Gramscian set of questions become pertinent: how state activities are framed, circumscribed, embedded in (or removed from) society, acted out, and made visible in ways that are intelligible and legitimate (or alien and illegitimate) within particular cultural and social contexts.

In exploring more fully the ways in which the micro (specific norms, preferences, and cultures) have an impact on the macro (state building as the creation and expansion in the capacity of state institutions), this book delves deep into the histories and practices of two highly competitive states in a particular time, cultural context, and place. The time was the immediate aftermath of 1949, which was by any standard a "critical juncture"[10] – a time of relative openness when, politically, a great deal was up in the air, amid the rapid hardening of Cold War boundaries and globally shared concern about the possibility of an outbreak of world war fought with nuclear weapons. The cultural context was China, a culture and civilization of great antiquity, a strong indigenous tradition of statecraft and imperial state organization that had been subject to nearly unceasing internal warfare, external invasion, bottom-up revolution, and a succession of weak central governments for an extended generation after the fall of the imperial dynasty in 1911–1912. The place was also China – a now reintegrating political entity that aspired to state-ness, greatness and "modernity." By accident rather than by design, in 1949–1950 political China possessed two unequal rival regimes in the early stages of regime consolidation – the explicitly revolutionary People's Republic of China, concentrating on its wealthy economic core in Sunan, in and around Shanghai, and the other equally explicitly conservative

[10] For further elaboration of the concept of critical junctures and their importance for institutional formation, see Capoccia, 2015, Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Kemelen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," and Hillel David Soifer, "The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures."

Republic of China, now immensely shrunken and relegated to a shaky existence on the island outpost of Taiwan.

The question I ask regarding these two cases is deceptively simple: how did two such ideologically diametrically opposed regimes manage to impose themselves over territories to which they came as armies of occupation with little natural base in society, build state institutions in their preferred images, and emerge with such well-consolidated states only a few short years thereafter? Regime consolidation is, of course, an ambiguous term; like "democratic consolidation" there may well be reasonable disagreement about when the process is complete, if ever. But if gauged by such markers as: (1) the establishment of internal security and social order over its territory; (2) the extension of state power to very local levels of society; (3) the development of sufficient capacity to implement core state policies; and (4) the ability to elicit the behavioral acquiescence if not the active support of key sectors of society, then both the PRC in Sunan and the ROC in Taiwan were by any standard rapid and thorough in their consolidations in the early 1950s. One might question the wisdom of their preferences and choices, and certainly from a human rights perspective both engaged routinely in actions that were nothing short of appalling, but no one can doubt that on their own terms they were both unusually successful in circumstances in which they might reasonably have been expected to falter, if not to fail altogether.

Twenty years ago, when I was preparing my first monograph for publication, I asked a related set of questions: why was it that the National Government of China in the late 1920s and 1930s – a weak and ineffective state that never managed to fully consolidate – managed to establish several core state institutions that were also unusually efficient and effective? The analytical framework that ensued from eighteen months of archival work in *Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927–1940* focused on four of the most critical state-building organizations for which information was available: the Examination Yuan, which attempted to implement a systemwide civil service system, two tax collecting agencies (the Salt Inspectorate and the Direct Tax Division within the Ministry of Finance), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[11] While the Examination Yuan's activities were more symbolic than consequential, the three remaining cases did exhibit clear

[11] External defense and internal security were, of course, spheres even more fundamental to state building than tax and foreign affairs in 1930s China; but I was interested in civilian, rather than the military dimensions of state-building, and in any case the data for military and internal security organizations were at that time either unavailable and/or too fragmentary to be useful.

evidence of unusual efficiency and effectiveness. I argued that these successes were the outcome of twinned strategies of internal bureaucratic insulation and external goal achievement; core administrative elites in tax and foreign affairs were permitted to buffer their organizations from a hostile and politicized environment by retaining control over personnel appointments and promotions, entry and promotion by strict civil service examination, and separate (and higher) salary scales. The price paid for this relative autonomy was demonstrable success in goal achievement in arenas of action without which the state could not survive. Tax organizations found goal achievement to be a particularly straightforward business, as their effectiveness or lack thereof (more tax receipts flowing to the central state) and efficiency (continued reduction of administrative costs as a percentage of tax intake) were at least easily measurable if not always easily achievable. These broad strategies of internal bureaucratization and insulation "bought" with externally visible high levels of goal achievement were, in principle, universal.[12]

These case studies were undoubtedly important – even necessary – components of state building and regime consolidation. Tax administration in particular has long been recognized to be so crucial that it is often used as a proxy for effectiveness in state building: particularly in a European context, the effectiveness of the state in extracting tax in order to field armies for war making was one of the key indicators of state strength and success.[13] With the important exceptions of rentier states (e.g. Kuwait) or city-state entrepôts (Hong Kong, Singapore), whose size and economic position make it relatively easy for the state to rely on indirect taxes, state-building efforts are often, even typically, correlated to the state's ability to extract resources from society in taxes of one sort or another.[14] What I had not quite realized twenty years ago is that in comparison to other arenas of state action such as welfare administration, education, public health, or indeed any activity that involves either resource redistribution or significantly changed behavior on the part of citizens, tax administration and foreign affairs are typically

[12] Julia C. Strauss, *Strong Institutions in Weak Polities*. Roughly a decade after the publication of this book, a literature in development administration emerged on ARAs (Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities) that almost perfectly replicated the strategies of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate; see Robert R. Taliercio, "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: the Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America," *World Development* 32:2, pp. 213–32. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, "Fighting Fiscal Corruption: Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue Authority", *Public Administration and Development* 23:2, pp. 165–175 and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad "Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47:1, pp. 1–18.

[13] Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State Making," Introduction in *The Formation of States in Western Europe*.

[14] Marcus J. Kurtz, *Latin American State Building in Comparative Perspective*.

relatively straightforward arenas of state activity. Neither attempts to alter the routine behavior of citizens, beyond compliance with tax payment. Both are comparatively easy to insulate from social pressures and claims, possess clear and consistent mandates from political leaders about what ought to be done, and, in the case of tax, engage in activity that is quantifiable. The government's orders to its tax agencies in the 1930s were straightforward and consistent: collect more in revenue and consume less in administrative costs. Insofar as they produced the goods, tax organizations were normally trusted and allowed to get on with the job. Highly educated diplomats possessed expertise that most political and party leaders did not: they spoke foreign languages, were able to mix socially with other diplomats and world leaders, and were well versed in the language and principles of international law. With this unique and crucial skill set, they were entrusted to plead China's case to international courts and special committees for the new League of Nations, negotiate for the removal of unequal treaties and to settle disputed borders, and raise international sympathy for China in its effort to isolate Japan. Like the imperative to raise increasing amounts of revenue for the central government, these core foreign policy goals of the 1930s were so consistent that they could be, in broad brush strokes, simply assumed. Hence there was little need to analyse the ideology, preferences, or norm building that predated policy choices, or to delve into how policies were implemented, as both were highly bureaucratic in the ways in which they approached their core tasks: they both justified and executed policy through strict application of impersonal rules. Tax administrators assessed tax according to bureaucratic rules about rates and penalties to those who did not comply, and responded to political masters by continued efficiencies in terms of administrative costs and effectiveness in returning ever larger amounts to the central government. Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomats also upheld bureaucratic strategies of policy implementation. They utilized bureaucratic, precedent oriented and rule-bound arguments, as they relentlessly applied international law (i.e. rules) to work in favor of the Chinese state. They tirelessly applied the minutiae of international law and international legal precedent to a variety of situations: negotiating with Western powers to (among other things) voluntarily give up extraterritoriality, adjudicate unclear borders, and censure the Japanese, and were, given China's weak international position in the 1930s, surprisingly successful at using these tactics to represent China and invoke international rules to China's advantage. However, for all their importance and effectiveness in providing core services necessary to the state, these cases suggested little about many other arenas of state activity: redressing severe inequality, promoting rural development,

providing social welfare, or altering the everyday behavior of citizens, where the Guomindang's efforts, as exemplified in the roundly mocked New Life Movement of 1934, were patchy to outright embarrassing.[15]

Temporally, empirically, and analytically, this work expands on *Strong Institutions in Weak Polities*. It picks up nearly a decade after *Strong Institutions* ends with the government's rapidly accelerating de-institutionalization under the stresses of the war against Japan. It focuses on a period of radical (dis)juncture in state building: the formative period of regime consolidation between 1949 and 1954, when the rump Nationalist government (Guomindang) under Chiang Kai-shek had retreated to the island of Taiwan and the nascent People's Republic of China was confronted with the staggering problem of how to rapidly build a credible party and state structure on a vast continent, much of which it had little to no recent experience of governing. It expands on the subject matter of *Strong Institutions* by engaging a direct comparison between two variants of the Chinese state: the People's Republic of China in China's wealthiest region – the lower Yangzi valley (Sunan) and the Republic of China in Taiwan. It also widens the case study selection. It carries over questions of state personnel recruitment from *Strong Institutions in Weak Polities,* but focuses on two other, quite different core projects undertaken by both Chinese states: (1) the suppression of domestic "subversion"; and (2) land reform. And analytically it considers not only what the state-making agendas and policy practices of these two rival regimes happened to be, but the actual rhetoric, dynamics and performative strategies by which these core policies were understood, justified, and implemented.

Thinking Comparatively about China and Taiwan at Mid-century: Cases of Success in Interesting Times

A comparison between the large, politically Communist People's Republic of China and the small, politically conservative Republic of China now confined to the island of Taiwan might seem to be at best misguided. With very few exceptions, notably Bruce Dickson's early work *Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties* (1997), and the somewhat more recent *Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan* volume edited by Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond (2008), there is little scholarly work that explicitly engages China-Taiwan (or PRC/ROC) comparisons. There are two solid and interrelated reasons for this reluctance: geographical scale, and the

[15] Arif Dirklik, "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement"; Wennan Liu, "Redefining the Legal and Moral Roles of the State in Everyday Life."

impact of Cold War politics. First, the political units encompassed by the People's Republic of China and the ROC after 1949 are vastly different in scale. Give or take some outlying border areas, the young People's Republic of China inherited a vast area whose borders were largely coterminous with those of the multi-ethnic Qing empire, while the ROC central government retreated to a small island that had undergone a twentieth-century history separate from the rest of China as a direct colony of Japan. Second, since the GMD regime so tied its post-1949 claims to legitimacy to its successes and good management in Taiwan, many have been reluctant to work on the 1950s and 1960s at all. For different reasons, work on the 1950s continues to remain sensitive in China and Taiwan. The People's Republic of China still draws legitimacy from what it considers to be its foundational Golden Age between 1949 and 1956; within Taiwan sensitivities about the martial law era's most violent phase in the early 1950s are still sharp, and those who portray the early 1950s in anything other than a starkly negative light are often marked as apologists for a brutal regime.[16] The dominant Cold War rhetorical stances of both have long insisted that these regimes were fundamentally different in kind, and the post Cold War combination of democratization and growing identification with Taiwan-ness within Taiwan also reinforces a contemporary sensibility of utter difference.

Despite these difficulties, comparisons between the PRC and ROC/Taiwan have the potential to be very fruitful, because these regimes had significantly more in common than either their Cold War rhetoric or their obvious differences in scale would otherwise suggest. In 1949, both shared a common Leninist single party-state structure that went back to the mid-1920s, when the CCP was a party fraction within a Guomindang reorganized by Soviet advisors. Both were deeply marked by China's political weakness in the face of imperialist pressure and by a previous half century of accelerating militarization, invasion, and civil war. Both assumed that their developmentalist goals were to be realized politically by *yidang zhiguo* (以黨治國 – "utilizing the Party to rule the country"). And, albeit in different ways, both continued to be deeply influenced by the institutional and normative legacies of late imperial governance.

[16] In Taiwan Guomindang conduct in the 1950s and 1960s continues to be a pertinent line of political fracture, with pan-Greens (the DPP and associated parties) deeply critical of the enormous human rights abuses committed by the Guomindang during this period, and pan-Blues on the whole choosing to avoid the topic entirely. In the process of organizing a workshop on Taiwan history during the martial law Chiang Kai-shek years with sessions in both Taibei and London in August and September 2009, it proved to be extremely difficult to get Taiwanese scholars to contribute. When one of the few who agreed presented her work, the tension in the room was palpable.

In order to pursue the comparison between regime consolidation in the PRC's very large territory and the ROC's now quite small one, I shrink the focus to a particular region within the PRC: Sunan ("South Jiangsu"), including the metropolis of Shanghai, its outlying districts (*jiaoqu* – 郊區), and the counties in what is now the province of Jiangsu that are south of the Yangzi River. Before it was amalgamated with Subei ("North Jiangsu") in 1954, Sunan possessed its own provincial-level government that was in turn directly administered by the East China Military Region. In principle, other regions of China taken over by the PLA – Minnan (south coastal Fujian), Sichuan, or the Pearl River Delta could have been equally good choices, but there are two especially compelling reasons for the choice of Sunan. First, the importance of the greater Shanghai/Sunan region for "New China" is hard to overstate. Because the region had long been China's wealthiest, and was in 1949 the center of China's industrial and modern economy, the otherwise impoverished young People's Republic required its political compliance and its economic flows: without the resources of Sunan and Shanghai, it was hard to see how state as a whole could be put on a solid footing. Second, the combination of unusually liberal archival and library access for foreign scholars in the late 1990s and the 2000s in Sunan and Greater Shanghai, and a wealth of secondary literature in both English and Chinese for the early 1950s has meant that the range of available sources is especially rich.

There are, of course, questions that could be raised about the validity of a comparison between a sub-national/provincial unit of government such as Sunan and a central government that was to all intents and purposes coterminous with an island-province. Indeed the ROC on Taiwan experienced no small degree of awkwardness from the anomalous presence of a "central" government cheek by jowl with the still existing Taiwan provincial government.[17] But two factors mitigate these differences. *Yidang zhiguo* in the People's Republic was implemented through a fractally organized state, wherein self-contained local units of the party-state replicated the form and organization of the party-state units above them. Occasionally, higher-level authorities would send down inspectors or work teams to see how policy was or was not being implemented, and under extreme conditions could censure or dismiss local cadres. But for the most part, territorial units of the party-state at more local levels mirrored higher levels, and

[17] Indeed the anomaly was so deeply felt that in the early 1960s, the Taiwan provincial government was relocated to a distant, but central, site in rural Taiwan as a new model community signifying progress and modernity. See Bi-yu Chang, "The Rise and Fall of Sanminzhuyi Utopia," in *Place, Identity and National Imagination in Post-War Taiwan*, (Routledge, 2015) pp. 112–154.

responded to signals from above in party line, propaganda, and directives. There were occasions when the signals from above became stronger, and were presented as direct "suggestions." Sub-national government units were expected to *replicate* the form and implement the broad directives from above, but to do so in the light of their own circumstances, personnel, and resources. In the end implementation was down to the local governments, and local governments in Sunan/Shanghai were so important to the central party-state that they were seldom, if ever, directly interfered with.

Perhaps the most important similarities between these bitterly opposed regimes in Sunan and Taiwan lay in the things that they needed to accomplish under highly challenging, and similar, circumstances. These undifferentiated party-states came to Sunan and Taiwan as external occupiers, with but weak and shallow social roots in the territories over which they exercised coercive control. Initially, neither had particularly promising materials with which to work. Years of invasion and warfare had done their worst: devastated economies, hyperinflation, armies, and populations in need of resettling were just some of the most pressingly immediate problems. Both needed to establish state hegemony over the societies over which they presided when the societies in question were at best passive and nervous and at worst smoldering with hostility. In so doing, they needed to exercise control and mobilize the state's use of material, social, and ideational resources, and moreover they needed to do it quickly, as in the early Cold War environment of the 1950s, nothing less than survival was felt to be at stake. And both were, by any reasonable measure incredibly *successful* in grasping these nettles. They managed to establish internal security, close off exit options and harden borders, extend state power to very local levels of society, implement core policies, fundamentally remake the countryside, and garner at least acquiescence if not active support from core constituencies of their populations. Indeed, the Communist, revolutionary, mobilizational People's Republic in Sunan, and the Nationalist, conservative, developmentalist Republic of China on Taiwan stood out as virtual prototypes for these different forms of state reintegration and development in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet there was nothing foreordained about these successes. In 1949 an incredibly daunting policy environment of weak domestic institutions, lack of popular support, and very sharp regional security tensions all pointed to precisely the opposite outcomes.

Critical Contingencies: From Cold to Hot War and Back Again, 1949–1954

In the early stages of the Cold War, the coercive core at the heart of the state lay close to the surface in a way that is difficult to recapture

two full generations later. This was particularly so for the divided states of Germany, Korea, and China. The war-torn 1940s made for great fluidity: decisions had to be made in circumstances under which much was still uncertain. Many who had supported the losing side in the civil war had only a brief window to act on their ideological and political commitments, and they had to do so in a situation in which there were a great many unknowns. Remaining in China, leaving the country, starting over abroad, or following the GMD to Taiwan were all possibilities, and each of these possibilities carried risks: how likely the GMD was to survive on Taiwan, and how punitive the incoming Communists would likely be to GMD supporters were very open questions. Either by conviction or chance, individuals made different decisions or had different opportunities and constraints; families often split.[18] For several months after October 1949, the situation in militarily insecure southwest China was uncertain enough that it was not clear where new borders would be settled. Over the course of 1949 and 1950, the Chinese state was increasingly sharply divided between two ideologically supercharged, mutually antagonistic regimes, each claiming legitimacy over the whole. Each allied with a different nuclear superpower in an increasingly bipolar world. Sharp ideological and moral differentiation from the evil "Other" was imperative, as was the hardening of previously porous borders. And both deployed relentlessly harsh propaganda and didactic indoctrination of their populations in order to stiffen a sense of identification and differentiate the purity of the self from the craven Other across the Taiwan Strait.

Although the term "Cold War" very shortly thereafter came to be used widely to describe the tense bipolar world order that was then gelling, for neither of the two Chinas was the Cold War an abstraction, a metaphor, something far away, or even particularly "Cold." The regional heat (and its accompanying blasts of deeply felt insecurity) generated by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 had a lasting – and unintended – impact on these two Chinese states. It artificially preserved the ROC regime in Taiwan. The rump of the GMD regime had retreated, battered and in shock, to Taiwan, and was in no position militarily to resist a PLA amphibious landing. The US Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly refrained from including either Taiwan or South Korea in the US "defensive

[18] What is often overlooked is that the majority of those who ended up following the GMD to Taiwan had no choice in the matter, as they were young, typically peasant males who formed the GMD troops that were recalled to Taiwan between 1949 and 1952.

perimeter" in the Pacific in January 1950.[19] Other sources, particularly the "China White Paper" (*United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944–49, based on the Files of the Department of State*) published in August 1949, ascribed the outcome of China's civil war in the CCP's favor to purely internal domestic causes, and made it clear that enough billions had been poured into supporting ineffective Nationalist armies.[20] With these signals from the ROC's hitherto chief patron, almost no one anticipated that the co-existence of two different Chinese regimes would last beyond the summer of 1950.

The widely expected PLA invasion of Taiwan in the summer of 1950 never came. An unexpected exogenous shock – the outbreak of war in Korea on June 25, 1950, dramatically redefined US foreign policy towards Asia. Overnight, the US defensive "security perimeter" was redrawn to include both Korea south of the 38th parallel and the island of Taiwan. Within three days, the US Seventh Fleet was dispatched to "neutralize" the Taiwan Straits and prevent either of the belligerents in the Chinese civil war from launching amphibious actions against the other. Since the ROC/Taiwan government was in no position to do any such thing, the US naval intervention in the Taiwan Straits could only prevent the PRC from concluding the Chinese civil war. Were it not for two contingent events, Kim Il-song's miscalculation in believing he could forcibly oust the Syngman Rhee regime south of the 38th parallel and the United States' unexpectedly strong intervention on the side of South Korea, in all likelihood there would have been no ROC/Taiwan regime to consolidate its rule in Taiwan after 1950. A more perfect instance of a critical juncture with outsized downstream effects is difficult to imagine.

The protagonists in the Chinese civil war were simultaneously shapers *of* and fundamentally shaped *by* the emerging Cold War. The very existence of rival regimes on opposite sides of the Cold War deepened rifts in the global Cold War, while the Cold War hegemons – the Soviet Union and the United States – wielded extraordinary influence over the state-building efforts of the two Chinas in direct and indirect ways. The

[19] Dean Acheson, "Speech on the Far East" (at the National Press Club), January 12, 1950. http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/speech-on-the-far-east/ accessed November 8, 2016.

[20] Robert Beisner, *Dean Acheson, A Life in the Cold War*, pp. 185–189. Lyman Van Slyke, ed. *The China White Paper,* https://archive.org/details/VanSlykeLymanTheChinaWhitePaper1949. See especially Li Tsung-ren (Li Zongren, Acting President of the Republic of China in the spring of 1949) to President Truman in a letter dated May 5, 1949: "It is regrettable that, owing to the failure of our then Government to make use of this aid and to bring about appropriate political, economic, and military reforms, your assistance has not had the desired effect. To this failure is attributable the present predicament in which our country finds itself." Page 409, accessed November 8, 2016.

overwhelming influence of the United States on the ROC/Taiwan is undeniable: it served as military guarantor, funder, trainer, source of technology transfer and the eventual unprecedentedly open market so crucial for the later economic "miracle" of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the ROC/Taiwan was by no means the puppet of the United States: the GMD government proved to be extremely adept in accepting the aid and technical advice that it wished to adopt while deflecting the more liberal political advice that it wished to ignore, by playing on US fears of a regional Communist threat and presenting itself as a stable and secure ally.

Although the degree of the Soviet Union's influence on the People's Republic of China was certainly less direct than was the US impact on the ROC/Taiwan, it was still considerable. Here it suffices to point out two salient features: (1) Mao took the young PRC's relationship with the Soviet Union so seriously that his one foreign trip was to Moscow, in the winter of 1949–1950, to conclude the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance; (2) the political economy of "New China" was set up along explicitly Stalinist lines in ways that fostered close to total state economic and political control, and the material aid given by the Soviet Union in the 1950s in combination with a favorable set of terms by which China participated in a "socialist world economy" was important for establishing the core of China's heavy industry. Thus, even though the Soviet Union's direct aid to the People's Republic of China was less than that provided by the United States to the much smaller ROC/Taiwan, the Soviet Union's ideational legacy was essential to the key political institutions and core agendas of the revolutionary state. Without the lessons learned from international socialism in general and the Stalinist form of the planned economy in particular, one cannot make sense of the PRC's subsequent choices in terms of squeezing out markets, rapid building of state channels for the production and distribution of goods, the establishment of the *tonggou tongxiao* (unified purchase and sale of grain), the establishment of the *danwei* (work unit), and eventually the unbelievably rapid nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture in 1955.[21]

International alignment on opposite sides of the Cold War did not mean that decision makers in the Chinese regimes on the opposite sides of the Taiwan Straits lacked agency. Within these broad international and regional alignments, each had a set of basic state building goals, a set of demographic, social, and economic conditions as background givens, and a range of preferred repertoires through which decisions were made to

[21] William Kirby, "The Internationalization of China."

work with the givens in realizing those goals. "New China" and the ROC on Taiwan had remarkably overlapping core agendas at the outset of regime consolidation in 1949. Both had to simultaneously secure the state's territory against external incursions, rid the country of internal security threats, and ensure, if not active support then at least the passive acquiescence of core sectors of society to the new regime. These basic commonalities in turn led to remarkably similar programs: to bring down hyperinflation to stabilize the economy and ensure the subsistence of cities unable to feed themselves, register populations, establish internal security and mutual surveillance at the grass roots, and implement land reform. Effective pursuit of these tasks required much-expanded institutions of the state, which in turn meant the ability to mobilize individuals working in state institutions to implement these core programs, and wherever possible, to lessen the cost of social resistance to new state programs. But clarity over the desirability of agreed state-building agendas is one thing: translating those goals into practice is quite another. Agents staffing state organizations might blunt the application of central policy: key groups in society could resist or subvert government initiatives.[22]

In order to keep their own state agents on board and their populations at least quiescent, if not actively enthusiastic, the PRC in Sunan and the ROC in Taiwan drew on a shared set of repertoires within two overlapping modalities of state building and policy implementation: (1) the bureaucratic; and (2) the campaign. Both modalities reached back into the "deep history" of the late-imperial Chinese state, now revived and adapted by the particular combination of party, state, and military fusion that had characterized the CCP and the GMD since the mid-1920s. State-making elites in Sunan and Taiwan were clear in their understanding that campaign and bureaucratic modalities of state making were mutually supporting: campaigns could be, and were, applied to establishing and strengthening the bureaucratic institutions of the state itself by mobilizing the commitments of cadres and civil servants and overcoming social resistance. In the early 1950s, this presumption of mutual reinforcement between campaign and bureaucracy was largely accurate. But campaign and the bureaucratic modalities of state making and policy implementation, in turn, comprised fundamentally different logics and principles that were in tension with each other, overlapped and interacted

[22] Harry Truman's comments about Dwight D. Eisenhower winning the Presidential election of 1952 are particularly apt: "He'll sit here, and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike – it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating." Cited in Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power, the Politics of Leadership* (Wiley, 1960), p. 9.

with each other in unpredictable ways, and were only partially reconcilable. Over the long run, state makers could only fully deploy one while rowing back on the other.

Modalities of State Building (I): Radical Simplification through Creating and Expanding Bureaucratic Institutions

The state's administrative organizations are obviously important for state building and policy implementation, but there is surprisingly little in political sociology that conceptualizes how state administration works or falters. Those who study China have long acknowledged its state's longevity, its history of civil service by open competitive examination, its struggle-laden transformation to the "modern" in the twentieth century, the nomenklatura system of appointment it adopted from the Soviet model in the People's Republic of China, and the way it did or did not work in different sectors or at different spatial scales.[23] Some point explicitly to Mao Zedong's deep mistrust of "bureaucracy" as a key factor in the launching of the enormously disruptive campaigns of his later years.[24] Ironically, the more radical the revolutionary state became in wanting to purge itself of suspected counterrevolutionaries, counterrevolutionary backsliding, and "bureaucracy," the more coercion, state power, and state personnel to exhaustively comb through the background files of suspects was necessary was necessary to ensure the purity of the revolution.[25] But despite the frequency with which the state is invoked as integral to most subjects on post-1949 China, after Franz Schurmann's seminal work *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (1966, 1969), very few have systematically explored the concept of bureaucratic state organizations, and what this has meant, both normatively and practically, in a mid-twentieth century Chinese context.

Part of the problem is that the terms "bureaucracy" and "bureaucratic" *guanliao* ("bureaucratic" – 官僚) and "bureaucratism" (*guanliaozhuyi* –官

[23] The literature here is vast; but a very preliminary bibliography would include: Benjamin A. Elman, *Civil Examinations and Meritocracy in Late Imperial China*; John Burns, *The Chinese Communist Party's Nomenklatura System*; Vivienne Shue, *The Reach of the State*; and Frederick Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*. Kimberley Ens Manning and Felix Wemheuer's edited volume, *Eating Bitterness New Perspectives on China's Great Leap Forward and Famine* also illustrates beautifully how central policies played out very differently in different locations.

[24] Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic,* 3rd ed., pp. 156–157, 251–259; Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*: (Vol. 1) *Contradictions Among the People 1956–57*, p. 59; Frederick Teiwes, ibid., pp. 7–8, 192–193, and 198–199.

[25] I am indebted to Michael Schoenhals for this insight.

僚主義), carry even more noxious connotations in Chinese than they do in English, conveying official arrogance, remoteness, paper pushing, and utter lack of responsiveness or accountability. Mao railed against "bureaucracy," despised the "bureaucratic work style," and went to great lengths to maintain a Yan'an-era revolutionary technique of the "mass line" that maintained "close links with the people." This distaste notwithstanding, whether called "bureaucracy," "administration," "state organs," "bureaus," or "the government," formal, hierarchical administrative organizations are an essential component of any state that claims centrality over a given territory. Administrative organizations provide the skeletal structure of the state: at a minimum they extract resources, maintain centrality, establish internal order, and provide for external defence. Beyond these minimums, they either implement or promote a wide range of other activities, depending on the state's core projects. These might include such tasks as providing for famine relief and road maintenance, establishing the guidelines by which young people will be socialized in school, regulating businesses, administering justice, and/or a host of more "revolutionary" measures (radically redistributing wealth, fundamentally reshaping gender and family relations, nationalizing industries, and so on). Revolutionary regimes are particularly prone to require substantial state administrations, for the simple reason that administrations that make the projection of state power possible are necessary to implement revolutionary programs of transformation.

But what are the essential properties of these state administrative organizations, how do they function, and how do they come into existence when they were previously either non-existent or weak? It is precisely this set of questions that is addressed by what I call "bureaucratic modalities of state building." Following Weber, I define the "bureaucratic" as the stuff of which "state institutions" are made: formal organizations, hierarchical lines of authority that garner the compliance of lower levels in the hierarchy, and behavior that relies on impersonal rulemaking and rule implementation.[26] By definition, a bureaucratic organization is one that is organized hierarchically. Decisions reached at higher levels must be incumbent and binding on lower levels in the hierarchy to ensure internal coherence. Bureaucratic decisions function by rulemaking over relevant classes of things, situations, or circumstances.[27]

[26] For the classic statement of Weber's conception of bureaucracy, see H. H. Gerth and C. H. Mills, *From Max Weber*, pp. 196–203.

[27] This is known in public administration circles as the "politics/administration dichotomy," but is often elided as "the policy/administration dichotomy." It has a lengthy lineage dating back from Woodrow Wilson's seminal article "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 2:2 (1887), pp. 197–222.

James Scott suggests that the core activity of the state is in "making legible" the societies and economies within which the state works.[28] The kinds of legibility to which Scott refers are realized through a fundamental bureaucratic logic: to radically *simplify* complex realities through *depersonalization*: disaggregating wholes in order to classify, record, and monitor data broken down into standardized categories of constituent units (people, incomes, housing, miles of railroad track or tarmac, grade of land, hectares of forest cut, trees from those cuttings assessed by specific grades), so that units can be measured, information can be passed up through the organizational hierarchy and then policy decisions about implementation passed back down. In principle each standard classification will merit the application of the same rule for as long as the rules are not changed.

The kinds of standardized classification, monitoring, and record keeping so integral to the bureaucratic modality and so necessary for the state to be able to implement preferred policies presuppose the existence of a coherent and responsive state organization with a fair amount of capacity. As this trifecta of desirable attributes – coherence, responsiveness, and capacity – was in uncertain evidence in the years immediately after 1949, both the PRC and the ROC were deeply committed to strengthening their states in order to establish coherence, augment responsiveness, and expand capacity, and they instinctively turned to bureaucratic logics in so doing. While the term *guanliao* (bureaucratic) is never encountered in Chinese as anything other than a pejorative, the young People's Republic of China in Shanghai issued a constant stream of exhortations to "strengthen organization" and "strengthen [state] organs (*jiaqiang zuzhi* – 加强組織, *jiaqiang jiguan* – 加强機關). In practice, "strengthening organization" meant expanding the capacity of state organizations to collect and record information according to standardized units of measure, recording this information in a timely way, and implementing and reporting on policies decided by higher levels of the organization. Personnel sufficiently trained in the meat and potatoes of the bureaucratic modality – statistics and accounting to standardize, simplify, and exert a modicum of control through counting, recording, and checking on local implementation – were in perennially short supply, and the need to "strengthen statistical and accounting work" (*jiaqiang tongji/kuaiji gongzuo* – 加强統計會計工作) continued to be acute well into the 1950s.

The ROC/Taiwan discourse on state administration betrayed little worry over the state's capacity for standardized counting and record keeping, but it was, if anything, even more concerned than was the PRC

[28] James C. Scott., *Seeing Like a State*.

about compliance with standardized rulemaking. It insisted with some vigor on the morally charged norm of "legality" in its state organizations that operated "according to law." The law in question was martial law and/or administrative law, but the principles of precedent and uniform application were, in essence, identical to those of bureaucracy. The young PRC and the ROC/Taiwan alike required bureaucratically organized administrative organizations to establish control over society, exhibit internal coherence, keep records, transmit information up the hierarchy, and begin to implement the kinds of signature policies by which society would be fundamentally remade in the preferred vision of the dominant party-state. Whether called "strengthening state organs," "strengthening organization," or "implementing policy according to law," the institutionalized hierarchy, inequality, standardization, rulemaking, rule implementation, and record keeping that are so characteristic of the Weberian conception of bureaucracy were an inescapable part of regime consolidation and state building in the immediate aftermath of 1949 on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

Modalities of State Building (II): Radical Simplification through Campaigns and Narratives

Yundong (運動) is typically translated into English as "campaign" a word with multi-vocal connotations and denotations. Originally French (*campagne*), "campaign" can mean quite different things in English. It makes its first appearance at roughly the time of the English civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century in an explicitly military context of relatively short, often seasonally defined periods of army field operations. Roughly a century later, "campaign" also came to refer to actions *analogous* to military campaigns, either "having a distinct period of activity, in being of the nature of a struggle, or of an organized attempt aiming at a definite result." By the early nineteenth century, the term encompassed both collective action (e.g. rent-reduction campaigns in Ireland) and elections, although the term for organized collective action eventually became separate as "movement," a word with a similarly wide range of different uses and connotations.[29]

Originally, the Chinese term *yundong* also had a restricted set of meanings in the realms of physics and medicine: denoting the movement of objects or the quickening of blood flow through the intestines to signify greater energy and vigor. By the end of the second decade of the twentieth

[29] See entry for "campaign," *Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford, 1991), p. 324.

century, *yundong* came to refer to the broadly based social movements emblematic of Republican China that protested the weak and corrupt Republican-era governments so ineffective in dealing with foreign imperialism (whether of the Western or Japanese variety).[30] From 1925 onward, such social movements were often entangled with leftist organization and agitation. While Mao's polemic, "Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" was immortalized in 1927, it took until the CCP was pushed into the countryside for it to begin a long process of experimentation by which *yundong* would come to be as much directed, planned, and staged processes from above by the vanguard party as they were social movements from below. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the CCP launched large numbers of *yundong* in such different arenas as directed mass mobilization in rent reduction and radical land reform in the Jiangxi Soviet, public hygiene, the harsh internal campaigns of party rectification in early 1940s Yan'an, and the strictly military "Hundred Regiments" campaign against the Japanese in 1941–1942.[31]

The GMD also used *yundong* in nearly identical ways: in the military "Encirclement campaigns" to wipe out the Communist Jiangxi base area, in the ongoing legitimacy it continued to draw from the May 4 Movement of 1919, in public hygiene, and, by the mid-1930s, in a clumsy effort to impose a party directed *yundong* to state building ends through the much mocked "New Life" movement (*Xin shenghuo yundong* – 新生活運動), which attempted to change the personal habits, attire, and cleanliness of the urban population from above, albeit without either popular mobilization or input.[32] By the late 1940s, when the GMD was locked in mortal battle with the CCP, there was substantial mimesis between the two rivals. The "Liquidate Traitors Campaign" (*xiaojian yundong* – 消奸運動) in the National Industry Defense Corps almost perfectly foreshadowed the CCP's own Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries only a few years later, and its "Oppose American Support for Japan Campaign" (*fanmei furi yundong* – 反美孚日 運動) for the 1948 May Day celebrations – strongly paralleled the CCP's first mass mobilization after 1949, the "Resist America, Support Korea" campaign (*fanmei yuanchao* – 反美援朝).

[30] *Cihai*, 3rd ed. (Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 1979), p. 96.
[31] Stephen C. Averill, *Revolution in the Highlands: China's Jingganshan Base Area*, pp. 199–221, 239–252.
[32] Arif Dirlik, "The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution"; Federica Ferlanti, "The New Life Movement in Jiangxi Province, 1934–1938"; Chieko Nakajima, "Health and Hygiene in Mass Mobilization: Hygiene Campaigns in Shanghai, 1920–1945."

In the generation prior to 1949, *yundong* had come to refer to overlapping, yet different, phenomena: exercise to remake the body, military campaigns, social movements of protest from below, and attempts by the Leninist single party – be it Communist or Nationalist – to mobilize populations under its control towards party-directed goals in such different spheres as rooting out traitors and public hygiene. As such, its expansion closely paralleled the rise of the party-state, in both its GMD and CCP variants, moving from physical activity and sports, to social movements, to something fairly close to the notion of campaign that is most commonly used in Chinese now: the state's extraordinary mobilization of people and resources to implement a specific program to accomplish particular goals in a defined period of time.

Much of the writing on the CCP, both in terms of its pre-1949 antecedents and its first revolutionary decades in power tends to plot the politics and history of the CCP against its nearly annual *yundong*. The conventional political history of the People's Republic of China, punctuates time and its successes by the great mass mobilizational campaigns from the Aid Korea/Resist America patriotic campaign of the autumn of 1950, to the campaigns of the early 1950s (the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and land reform campaigns (1951), the "Three Antis" (1951–1952), the "Five Antis" (1952–1953), and Thought Reform (1953)). These were followed by campaigns for mutual aid teams, collectivization, nationalization of private enterprises, another "clearing out of counterrevolutionaries" (*sufan*) campaign, and the anti-Hu Feng campaign of the autumn of 1955. These were but a precursor to some of the most destructive campaigns of all: the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957, the Great Leap Forward and its various sub-campaigns (1958 and passim), the Socialist Education Campaign (1963), and eventually the Cultural Revolution and its myriad sub-campaigns (1966–1976). Indeed, the broad-brush outline of successive national campaigns after 1949 serves as a kind of shorthand for revolutionary China itself during these years, which was above all characterized by frontal attacks in service of whatever line the CCP was then promoting: intense pushes of government focus on a given set of goals with state directed social mobilization.[33]

Important as these mass campaigns obviously were for the Chinese Communist Party and its approach to rule after 1949, there is much that is lost in equating state campaigns exclusively with those of the ever-more radical Mao-era People's Republic of China. A broader view suggests that there is a range of practices that can all be called "campaign," even when

[33] Merle Goldman, "The Party and Intellectuals."

they were devoid of the kind of public mass mobilization so typical of those launched by the young PRC in the 1950s and 1960s. If campaigns are instead defined as *extraordinary* and *temporary* mobilizations of human and material resources for the rapid accomplishment of a specific goal, it is clear that the Chinese state resorted to campaigns as a method of policy implementation both before and after the revolutionary Maoism of the People's Republic of China. For example, the eighteenth-century Qing state launched campaigns in such different policy arenas as water conservancy, internal security, and distribution of relief from state granaries to ameliorate local famines. But unlike its counterparts in Europe, the Qing state did not seek to regularize campaigns into permanent expanded state organizations of greater infrastructural power.[34] The Guomindang as well as the Chinese Communist Party attempted to launch campaigns to build social support, engage in military training and battle, and (ultimately in Taiwan with much greater success) push through a major party rectification, and major policy initiatives.

Although the Mao-era mass mobilizational campaigns are best remembered, both before and after 1976, there were many other types of campaigns with very different goals and often substantially less (if any) popular involvement. Rather than defining the campaign as a unique feature of the revolutionary People's Republic of China that was renounced when the CCP leaders convened at the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee in December 1978 shortly after Mao's passing, it is perhaps more accurate to conceive of a broad range of campaigns with only one variant – the mass mobilizational campaign – abandoned in the post-Mao reform era. In the post-1978 era People's Republic, such different policy arenas as "Spiritual Pollution," crime, corruption, and the enforcement of birth control quotas have all involved extraordinary concentrations of political will and bureaucratic mobilization to realize a given goal without a concomitant level of mass mobilization.[35]

[34] I am indebted to R. Bin Wong for his helpful formulation of this definition of a campaign. See also R. Bin Wong, "Formal and Informal Mechanisms of Rule and Economic Development: The Qing Empire in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Early Modern History* 5:4, pp. 387–408.

[35] While the importance of mobilizational campaigns in revolutionary China is acknowledged in nearly all works on the subject of Chinese politics in the Mao years, surprisingly few have attempted to develop a comprehensive analysis of campaigns. For two relatively early works see Charles Cell, *Revolution at Work: Mobilizational Campaigns in China* (Michigan: Academic Press, 1977) and Gordon Bennett, *Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asia Press, 1976). More recent research makes clear how important campaign dynamics continued to be in the reform period. See Melanie Manion, *Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong* (Harvard University Press, 2004), see especially Chapter 5. M. Scot Tanner, *Strike Hard: Anti-crime Campaigns and Chinese Criminal*

State-led campaigns in pre-and-post 1949 China had different policy objectives, were directed to different sectors of the population, and encompassed differing levels of social participation and mass mobilization. Some campaigns began and ended within the state's own bureaucracy, as it geared up and mobilized to implement a particular policy or program. Others drew in and mobilized the general population to tackle fixed and relatively short-term goals (draining a swamp, building a bridge, wiping out schisomatosis), or were aimed at a specific industry or sector (e.g. steel production drives or the rapid collectivization of agriculture). Some attempted to change the chronic behavior of defined groups (e.g. the anti-prostitution and anti-opium campaigns launched by the local governments in Chinese cities in 1949 and 1950), or the public more generally (anti-spitting campaigns), and still others involved the full-scale mass mobilization that publicly targeted internal or external enemies of the state (the three "Great Campaigns" of the early People's Republic).[36]

I suggest that irrespective of goals, type, or time period, a campaign modality of policy implementation is characterized by the following three attributes: (1) the mobilization of state administrative organizations ("the bureaucracy") for the intensification of focus around implementing a particular program; (2) fixed and typically short duration; and (3) a big and well publicized push to accomplish clearly defined targets and goals. Like the bureaucratic modality of policy implementation, the campaign modality *radically simplifies* complex realities. But it does so in an utterly different way. Rather than break down complex and interconnected phenomena into constituent and standardizable parts amenable to rules, the campaign simplifies by fusion, compression, and frontal attack, merging the complex and multifaceted into an organic whole, condensing the time allotted for implementation, and engaging the emotional commitments of those it draws in with explicit appeals to normative goods.

State campaigns invariably require as a first step the extraordinary intensification of focus and mobilization of resources within the regularly constituted administrative organizations of the state, and it is here that the campaign intersects with the Chinese state's other key modality of bureaucratic implementation. The campaign focuses on readily graspable objectives, justifies its policies towards the objectives in straightforward morally

Justice, 1979–85 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). Ralph A. Thaxton, Jr., *Force and Contention in Contemporary China: Memory and Resistance in the Long Shadow of the Catastrophic Past* (Cambridge: 2016).

[36] See Julia C. Strauss, "Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early People's Republic of China: Regime Consolidation and After, 1949–1956," in Strauss, ed., *The History of the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

based stories, and claims that a rapid push to achieve the objectives will solve a larger outstanding social, political, or economic problem. But in contrast to bureaucracy, which is organized around the regular, the standardizable, and the predictable in its rule-based implementation, a campaign is *by definition* extraordinary, often sidestepping or overriding the procedural and rule bound in its efforts to realize quick results. For this reason, the campaign exists in ambiguous tension with bureaucracy. It needs the organizational capacity and coherence that bureaucratic hierarchies provide, but its modality – extraordinary mobilization, sharp focus, compressed time scale, and sidestepping rules – is the opposite of the bureaucratic, which stresses rules, precedent, and defined temporal sequencing. Campaigns cannot completely undercut the formal institutions of the state, whose normal workings reify hierarchy and impersonally determined rules, but without strict limits, their defining modality of implementation runs the risk of so doing.

Performance in Policy Implementation: The How Is as Important as the What

Questions of performance permeate both bureaucratic and campaign modalities of state building. "Performance," like "campaign," is a highly charged term with many different meanings and uses. It can refer to an evaluation of the effectiveness of something ("a non-performing loan"), an evaluation of how well or appropriately something is done as in an individual's work ("annual performance review"), or a matter of public policy ("the performance of USAID in the mosquito net program in Malawi"). It can refer to the world of theater, film and music ("the performing arts"), or a particular instance of "performance" on a stage. Perhaps its most confusing use is in academia, as the term takes on distinct but overlapping meanings when used by different disciplines and interdisciplinary networks. In the realm of philosophy and semiotics, following the lead of J. L. Austin, "performance" is often understood in terms of a "speech act," best exemplified by the minister's classic utterance "I now pronounce you man and wife."[37] In theater studies it overlaps with notions of "theatricality."[38] In sociology and anthropology an important literature ties questions of performance to rituals, and rituals to the state.[39] A different interdisciplinary network of

[37] John L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words,* 2nd ed.

[38] Richard Schechner, *The Future of Ritual: Writings on Culture and Performance*; Schechner, *Performance Studies: An Introduction* (3rd ed.).

[39] The list of key writings in sociology and anthropology on the intersection of performance, meaning making, and ritual is enormous. Key texts include: Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967); Randall Collins,

sociologists, historians, and political scientists focuses on contentious politics and social movements, and applies theatrical metaphors of repertoire and analysis of performances by claim makers.[40] And Jeffrey Alexander makes a cogent case for the importance of performance, complete with background symbols, scripts, actors, audiences, and staging, to create "the emotional connection of audience with actor and text and thereby to create the conditions for projecting cultural meaning from performance to audience" as a way that society is "re-fused with meaning."[41] While the disciplines and levels of social theory engaged by all of these literatures differ, there is broad agreement that the content of political performance is made through culturally coded symbols, and commonly understood narratives and practices communicated through the content and the delivery of speech, dress, and manner of performance.

Important political speeches over the course of an electoral campaign (e.g. Presidential debates[42]), public trials and hearings (e.g. Gandhi's trial and the hearings of Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa[43]), electoral campaigns (in the United States and elsewhere[44]), and demonstrations/social movements (e.g. the civil

Interaction Ritual Chains (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004); Victor Turner's many works, the most important of which are perhaps *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), and "Social Dramas and Stories about Them," *Critical Inquiry* 7:1 (Autumn 1980), pp. 141–168. Still useful is the collaboration between Victor Turner and Richard Schechner in Richard Schechner, *Between Theatre and Anthropology* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), for which Turner wrote a forward. Schechner has also made a sequence of video recordings entitled "Performance Studies: An Introduction," that were uploaded to youtube in December 2012. Of these, Schechner's own explanation of Victor Turner's notions of social drama is particularly relevant. See weblink, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pnsw5xFuXHE accessed November 19, 2016. Clifford Geertz's *Negara: The Theatre State in 19th Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) stands out as the anthropological work that is the most directly relevant to concerns of state building, with his assertion that "the expressive power [of the Balinese state] was toward spectacle, toward ceremony, toward the public dramatization of the ruling obsessions of Balinese culture: social inequality and status pride … the stupendous cremations, tooth filings, temple dedications, pilgrimages and blood sacrifices, mobilizing hundreds and even thousands of people and great quantities of wealth, *were not means to political ends; they were the ends themselves: they were what the state was for*"(emphasis added), p. 13.

[40] Charles Tilly, *Contentious Performances; Regimes and Repertoires*, pp. 34–35.

[41] Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Performance and Power*, p. 53 and passim.

[42] David Zarefsky, "What 'went wrong' with the first Obama-Romney debate."

[43] Sudipta Kaviraj, "Gandhi's Trial Read as Theatre," in Julia C. Strauss and Donal D. B. Cruise O'Brien, *Staging Politics* (London: I.B. Tauris 2007), Tanya Goodman, Ron Eyerman, and Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Staging Solidarity,* and Catherine M. Cole, *Performing South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.*

[44] Alexander, *Staging Solidarity*; see also Dafydd Fell, "Putting on a Show and Electoral Fortunes in Taiwan's Multi-party Elections," and Vincent Foucher, "'Blue Marches': Public Performance and Political Turnover in Senegal," in Strauss and Cruise O'Brien, ibid., pp. 173–194, and pp. 111–132.

rights movement,[45] the "color" revolutions of Eastern Europe in 1989 and after, the symbolic confrontations between protesters and the government in the "Beijing Spring" of 1989),[46] and the pageantry of mass fascism[47] are all suitable phenomena to study the dramaturgy and performance of power from both above and below. The combination of limited duration, playing out in public space, and the media attention they attract makes for good theater, commanding narratives, and condensation into readily understood morality plays. However, with few exceptions, most of the work on performance in politics takes as its subject matter a defined performance or cluster of performances, rather than the wider political processes of which the performance is a part.[48] There is little reason to doubt that performance in politics is as important in regions of the world presented in scripts encoded with cultural references and moral resonances unfamiliar to the Western journalists who disseminate news more widely.

Regional insecurity, the need to build effective state institutions quickly, and the indifference, wariness and outright hostility of local populations led the Chinese Communist Party in Sunan and the Guomindang in Taiwan to establish order and implement signature policies, and to do so in particular performative registers that communicated regime identity and expectations of the population. In short, *how* policy was communicated and performed was as important as *what* policies were decided on and implemented. Campaigns played out in public space were obviously theatrical, seeking to engage the emotions (support, righteous indignation, a sense of opportunity), while they displayed regime norms to the population. But so too could key elements of a bureaucratic modality also be performative: was the state official a remote presence who feasted behind closed doors, only venturing out to demand requisitions for the state? Was the state official invariably male

[45] Alexander, "Performance and Counter-Power: The Civil Rights Movement and the Civil Sphere," in Alexander *Staging Solidarity*, pp. 147–158; Alexander, *The Performance of Politics: Obama's Victory and The Democratic Struggle For Power*, Tilly, *Contentious Performances*.

[46] Joseph Esherick and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "Acting Out Democracy: Political Theatre in Modern China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 49:4 (November 1990), pp. 835–865: Rudolf Wagner, "Political Institutions, Discourse and Imagination in China at Tiananmen," in James Manor, ed., *Rethinking Third World Politics*, originally published by Longman Press, 1991, republished (London: Routledge 2013), pp. 121–144.

[47] Mabel Berezin, "The Festival State: Celebration and Commemoration in Fascist Italy." *The Journal of Modern European History*, 3(1): pp. 60–74.

[48] Lisa Wedeen's two monographs, *Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2008) and *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999) are the outstanding exceptions to this tendency.

and in his fifties or sixties, or female and/or in his/her twenties or thirties? Was s/he dressed in foreign clothes and speaking a substantively different language by using a dialect so different that direct communication was impossible, or through scientific and technocratic jargon)? Were new rules (orders, directives, regulations) communicated by loudspeaker blaring in a singsong official voice, newsprint that reproduced the state's legalese or code words, or through trusted (or not so trusted) locals who spoke the same language as other locals? Did the state's official representative get to field sites by black Mercedes with smoked windows, or by bicycle, or foot? All these actions so inherent in the everyday rule orientation of state administration were equally part of the dramaturgy of state power – the Gramscian micro practices linked to the establishment and institutionalization of key state institutions of Weberian bureaucratic hierarchy and authority.

Outline of the Book

In order to explore the ways in which performance, bureaucratic and campaign modalities of statebuilding were deployed in the regime consolidation of the young People's Republic of China in Sunan and the traumatic rebuilding of the ROC in Taiwan in the early to mid-1950s, I turn to three paired case studies: (1) state personnel; (2) the terror unleashed by the state against its presumptive domestic enemies; and (3) land reform.

Chapter 1 on virtue and talent in the making of the two Chinas returns to a theme first articulated in *Strong Institutions in Weak Polities*: the importance of state administrators as implementing agents *for* the state without whom state-making programs could not be implemented and ideal reflections *of* the state, walking and talking embodiments of how the state wished to represent itself vis-à-vis society. Identifying, recruiting, and deploying individuals who were simultaneously: (a) sufficiently loyal and disciplined; (b) adequately competent to implement the tasks required by political masters at higher levels in the state; and (c) presenting a reasonable facsimile of the image that the state wished to project of itself and its core values, was, however, a tricky business. By delving into what state administrators were called, how they were recruited, and the terms by which they were evaluated, this chapter shows that while the PRC selected for heroic, generalist cadres as individuals and the ROC privileged formal civil service systems of recruitment and evaluation, both were deeply influenced by a late-imperial set of norms that presumed that moral virtue and technical ability were mutually reinforcing, and that the state had to select for individuals with a full quotient of both. Through

traditional rhetorics of *de jian cai* (德兼才 – virtue and talent) and "selecting for talent," each of these regimes sought to harness the individual state administrator's self-cultivation, responsiveness, and ability to do more with less. In this early stage of regime consolidation in the People's Republic of China, the Maoist tension between "Red" and "Expert" that would emerge in the late 1950s was quite unthinkable. The discourse on cadres and personnel systems assumed that an individual's virtue and talent were indispensably two sides of the same coin. State cadres in the young People's Republic of China were charged not only with implementing correct policy, but also with implementing it in the correct way. In a Maoist context, the "correct way" meant in accordance with the principles of the mass line: advanced consciousness, close links to the people, patient explanation of both what was being done and why it was being done. For its part, the formal civil service system of the ROC/Taiwan incorporated into its annual evaluations a surprisingly heavy component of "virtue," which was similarly defined by *how* work was done: in a diligent and timely manner; in a morally upright way; and with the ability and willingness to endure hardship. In Sunan and Taiwan, systems of formal state administration reflected the different goals to which each regime aspired: individual heroism reflecting the best of the Chinese Communist Party versus well-functioning systems that selected for the best to serve the party-state. The People's Republic of China in Sunan and the Republic of China in Taiwan faced similar dilemmas: how to recruit, socialize, and keep on board sufficiently loyal and capable state administrators to implement core state programs in a locale in which the regime was externally imposed. Despite their political differences, their assumptions about what state administrators should do, how they should behave, and what kind of face they should present to society overlapped substantially.

Chapters 2 and 3 turn to the first and perhaps most important activity of a state: the establishment and maintenance of internal security and social order by defining internal enemies, and then rigorously separating such threats from supporters or those with the potential to be won over. Because a generation of mutual interpenetration by spies amid accelerating regional insecurity with the outbreak of war in Korea meant that it was far from straightforward to determine who was friendly, neutral, hostile, or outright subversive, it was incumbent on authorities in Sunan and in Taiwan to launch campaigns against presumptive domestic enemies. The People's Republic of China did so in Sunan by organizing and implementing a vicious campaign against a range of undesirables whom it labeled counterrevolutionaries in the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries; the ROC/Taiwan declared martial law and

launched a series of police-cum-military actions against Communists and their fellow travelers, inaugurating the period that is now known in Taiwan as the "White Terror."

Chapter 2 focuses on questions of how such undesirables were categorized and identified, how wide ranging the terror was, and the ways in which the drive to root out enemies of the state was deliberately linked to wider questions of state building in Sunan and Taiwan. It lays out how both regimes instrumentally deployed what might well have been reasonable worries over internal security to target a broad range of presumptive domestic enemies in order to clear the ground of potential resistance in the future. In Sunan a wide range of political (ex-Guomindang) and social (secret societies, local bullies, leaders of heterodox religious sects) enemies were targeted. In Taiwan far more individuals were rounded up, imprisoned, and either executed or sent to prison camps on Green Island than there were Communists on the island. Although the scale of the terror in absolute numbers and as percentage of the population was significantly greater in Sunan than Taiwan, the campaign in Sunan was restricted to those who held high positions in the Guomindang's Party, military, security, and youth corps and others who were comprehensible as socially undesirable (local toughs, gangsters, the leaders of religious sects, and traitors). The majority of the urban population, and cadres in the CCP had little cause to worry about becoming targets of the campaign. In Taiwan, however, there was no sector of society that was safe from uneven and sporadically vicious police action campaigns under martial law, which overlapped with a stringent Guomindang Party rectification. Card-carrying Communists, rural Taiwanese who happened to know those now identified as Communists, party members and military officers who fell afoul of Chiang Kai-shek, and teachers and journalists caught with reading material recently banned as "Communist" were all fair game for suppression.

Chapter 3, "Performing Terror: Lenience, Legality, and the Dramaturgy of the Consolidating State" details the ways in which the state in Sunan and Taiwan implemented campaigns of terror in the early 1950s and communicated about its processes of implementation with wider (non-accused) publics. Each claimed that vigorous action against enemies of the state was essential for regime survival and social order, deployed theatrical forms to punish wrongdoers and disseminated regime norms to the population at large. What the content and staging of these shows communicated about the state to citizens was very different. The party-state in Sunan convened mass public accusation meetings, while the GMD insisted on (faux) legality through a formal process of closed military courts. The show in Sunan

was put on to mobilize the public and to garner its complicity in extreme violence against defined enemies of the state; the show in Taiwan was put on by the state itself for itself to provide a reassuring wrapper of legality and correct procedure around its extreme violence against defined enemies of the state.

Chapters 4 and 5 turn to the question of land reform, a signature policy for both the People's Republic of China and the ROC/Taiwan in the early 1950s. Chapter 4 considers why both the PRC and the ROC/Taiwan staked so much of their legitimacy on the successful implementation of land reform in the countryside. It explores the ways in which a consensus grew throughout the 1930s and 1940s, when the Chinese Communist Party, its foreign and domestic sympathizers, New Deal progressives, technocratic agronomists, and the Guomindang all converged on a set of core assumptions about rural China: (1) there was a crisis of rural immiseration and exploitation; (2) substantial land reform was necessary to restore a modicum of rural social justice; (3) land reform was therefore popular and demanded from below by the peasantry; and (4) as an agricultural country, China required the agricultural surplus that land reform could provide as the basis for further economic development. In 1949, it was obvious to all who reflected on the matter that the Guomindang had been so badly beaten because, in contrast to the Chinese Communists who had built a reservoir of support among the rural population at least in part because of its attention to land reform, the GMD had either ignored rural China or done too little too late.

What was manifestly self-evident to this consensus in 1949 was, however, not born out in the actual conditions of rural Sunan or Taiwan. The chapter then illustrates how in both landlordism was in decline, landlords were weak and/or not commonly hated by those in the rural population who remained in the countryside, and indeed in many places locals thought that their landlords were not such bad sorts at all. In Sunan, a vigorous market in small landholding meant that many of modest means like shopkeepers and petty traders owned and rented out small parcels of land, while in Taiwan the vast majority of landlords owned relatively small amounts of land, and those that held more on paper often only appeared to hold more because in many places brothers or cousins with adjoining fields had one family member register the entirety in his name. Mobility out of full-time farming was commonplace, as the young often migrated in search of factory work, only returning to the land at peak planting and harvesting times. Yet in both Sunan and Taiwan, land reform initiatives were implemented from above according to principles and rules determined by outsiders,

who in turn imposed a ready-made solution and set of categories quite irrespective of local rural realities.

Chapter 5 engages the ways in which land reform campaign implementation in Sunan and Taiwan exhibited surprising commonalities and significant divergences. The early to middle stages of land reform campaigns illustrate how these two regimes drew on similar campaign repertoires: the mobilization of the bureaucratic institutions of the state, the dissemination of intensive propaganda, and the substantial expansion of the state through the extraordinary recruitment of temporary staff, often patriotic and young, to go down to the countryside to aid regular officials in conducting land reform. The forms of public propaganda that accompanied campaigns to educate the rural population about such basic issues as why land reform was necessary, what measures it would involve, and the righteousness by which it would be implemented were strikingly similar. Both utilized similar forms for propaganda such as posters, newsreels, songs, and plays. Propaganda content to educate the rural population was also markedly similar, stressing the ways in which concentrated land holdings resulted in both social injustice and stagnant development in the countryside. Public performances were deployed to educate, persuade, and garner the participation of rural populations in land reform, but the form and content of these performances were markedly different. In Sunan, the state put on highly stage-managed public accusation sessions on makeshift stages in public space. Local cadres, who were responsible for these public shows, were given detailed instructions about how accusation sessions were to proceed: with sympathetic (and heavily coached) accusers to mount the stage at key moments, to confront the accused with their past evils and wrongdoings through dramatic "face to face" accusation in front of a large crowd whipped up into a frenzy of righteous anger. In Taiwan the state put on a very different kind of show: the limited public theater of local elections to the Farm Tenancy Committee, which, once the elections were held went on to adjudicate land disputes according to the laws and regulations handed down by the state behind the closed doors of the local Land Division Office.

The different ways in which these competitive regimes implemented violence against putative enemies and land reform initiatives reveal a great deal about how each understood itself, represented itself to society, and signaled what it expected from society in terms of political behavior. The dramaturgies of power that each of these consolidating states employed was not simply symbolic fluff that concealed the "harder" realities of state repression or land redistribution; they were

an integral part of these more coercive components of state building. But carrying out any state policy first required a large number of committed state officials to do the state's bidding, and it is to the ways in which these states imagined and created their agents and implementers that this book now turns.